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Summary 
Authors critique the results, assumptions, 
and policies commonly associated with agricultural 
credit projects in low income countries. A summary 
of new views on these projects is presented. These 
views emphasize voluntary savings mobilization and 
positive real rates of interest. Several explana-
tions are given for why few of these new views 
have been adopted by policymakers. 
The past several decades aid agencies have spent in excess 
of $5 billion dollars on rural financial market (RFM) projects. 
These projects have accompanied substantial increases in the 
number of institutions providing formal loans in low income 
countries (LICs), as well as increases in amounts spent by 
local governments for agricultural credit. Currently the vol-
ume of new agricultural loans in low income countries is in 
excess of 30 billion dollars U.S. per year. In several 
countries, especially Brazil and Thailand, agricultural credit 
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programs currently make up a very large part of the efforts 
aimed at agricultural development. 
In part, this intense interest in agricultural credit 
projects results from the ease with which they can be carried 
out, and the feeling that loans are a vital part of a pack-
age of inputs needed to stimulate change in agriculture. 
Some policymakers have also felt that cheap credit is an ef-
fective way of offsetting policies that penalize agriculture, 
and at the same time, a convenient way to treat rural poverty. 
In our opinion, this emphasis on loans to stimulate production 
and to help the poor has unfortunately diverted attention 
from the essential properties of finance, the process of 
financial intermediation, and the basic role that rural finan-
cial markets ought to play in development.ll While some atten-
tion has been given to overall resource misallocation caused 
by RFM policies, little attention is paid to how RFMs inter-
mediate between savers and borrowers [Wai, 1972a]. Likewise, 
very little attention has been given to how RFM policies affect 
overall income and wealth distribution and how political forces 
use financial systems to further their own aims. Even less 
attention has been given to how various policies influence 
the vitality of RFMs. 
Traditional Agricultural Credit Projects 
Many agricultural credit projects carried out in the past 
twenty years in LICs have been similar. ~/ Part of this is due 
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to the replication in these countries of financial institutions 
that were successful in several developed countries: credit 
unions, credit cooperatives, private banks, and supervised 
credit agencies. Additional similarities are due to the 
common assumptions that underlie most of these projects.11 
These assumptions can be grouped into those relating to saver-
borrower behavior, those associated with lender behavior, and 
those about the performance of rural finance markets. Common 
assumptions on saver-borrower behavior are that the rural poor 
cannot save and therefore will not respond to incentives or 
opportunities to save, that most farmers need cheap loans and 
supervision before they will adopt new technologies and make 
major farm investments, and that loans in-kind are used in 
the form granted. 
Common assumptions about lender behavior are that most 
informal lenders are exploitative and charge borrowers rates 
of interest that result in large monopoly profits, that the 
rural poor do not receive formal loans because formal lenders 
are overly risk averse, that nationalized lenders can be 
forced to ignore their own profits and losses to service risky 
customers and the rural poor, and that all formal lenders can 
be induced to follow government regulations in allocating 
financial services. At a national level it is commonly as-
sumed that cheap credit is an efficient way of off-setting 
production disincentives caused by low product prices or high 
input prices, that loan quotas established in the capital city 
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are efficient ways of allocating loans in the countryside, 
that loans should be a part of a package of inputs, that only 
production loans should be made, and that RFM vitality is not 
related to projects and policies. Recent research is showing 
that many of these assumptions are either unsubstantiated, 
weak, or incorrect. 
Because so many institutions and assumptions are similar, 
it should not be surprising that RFM policies and techniques 
in LICs are also very similar. For example, heavy emphasis 
has been placed on creating new financial institutions to 
service particular rural needs or target groups such as the 
rural poor. Many countries, for example, have created spe-
cialized agricultural banks or development banks that lend 
largely to agriculture [Bourne and Graham, 1980a]. Credit 
cooperatives, credit unions, and supervised credit programs 
have also been popular at various times and places. Seldom 
do these institutions offer financial savings facilities. 
Instead they depend largely on central banks, government 
budgets, and foreign aid for funds. 
Low interest rates are almost always assigned to formal loans 
and savings deposits alike, thereby penalizing savers. In nominal 
terms, rates of interest on agricultural loans may be as low as 
zero and seldom do they exceed 12 percent per year in most low 
income countries [World Bank, 1975, p. 79]. Typically, the rates 
of interest paid on rural savings deposits are much less than the 
concessionary rates charged on loans. Recent inflation has been 
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double-digit in most regions of the world, outside Asia. This has 
resulted in negative real rates of interest on most formal loans 
and deposits in rural areas [Galbis]. The real rate of interest 
is defined as the nominal rate of interest (the contractual rate) 
adjusted by some overall expected price index change for the 
economy.41 Because of the excess demand caused by these negative 
interest rates, governments have tried to force lenders to allocate 
loans to priority groups through quota systems, political 
persuasion, nationalization of banks, or through use of other indu-
cements [Johnson]. Lenders quickly find ways to subvert many of 
these regulations, however [Kane, 1978]. Portfolio quotas result 
in redefinition of loans by lenders and loan size limits cause len-
ders to extend multiple small loans to previous borrowers of large 
loans, for example. 
While some RFMs work better than others, a number of 
common problems stand out. These include very serious loan 
repayment problems in all too many countries [Boakye-Dankwa, 
Sanderatne]. It also includes very little medium and long-
term formal credit, and high loan transaction costs for some 
borrowers and most lenders. These transaction costs discour-
age some from seeking formal loans, and also discourage lenders 
from serving certain groups. A handful of recent studies show 
that the lender's costs of making agricultural loans to medium 
and small sized farmers is 20 percent or more of the value of 
the loans extended, even in moderately well run programs 
[Ahmed, and World Bank, 1978]. If the lender is in a country 
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experiencing substantial inflation, the nominal rates of in-
terest on loans needed to cover these lender costs and also 
maintain the purchasing power of the loan portfolio can be 
well in excess of 30 percent of the value of the agricultural 
loans made. 
Studies have also shown that the borrowers' costs of 
acquiring these formal loans can be substantially larger 
than the nominal interest payments [Adams and Nehman, Pablo]. 
Total borrowing costs, especially for borrowers of small 
amounts, may be two or three times as much as the nominal 
interest payments. These costs include waiting in line, trans-
portation costs, bribes, legal and title fees, paperwork ex-
penses, and time lost from work to deal with these demands. 
Even more serious, in all too many countries, policies 
have been ineffective in allocating a larger share of formal 
loans to agriculture in general and to the rural poor in 
particular because the risks, returns and costs of doing so 
are unattractive to formal lenders [Vogel and Larson, Fry, 
Ladman and Adams]. A less obvious problem relates to the 
nature of innovation taking place in RFMs. Most of these in-
novations are increasing rather than decreasing the total cost 
to society of financial intermediation. Many of these "dis-
torted" innovations are defensive in nature; that is, they 
emerge in response to various regulations such as loan port-
folio quotas and interest rate ceilings [Bhatt]. In extreme 
cases financial markets may overbuild facilities in rural areas 
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in order to syphon off savings deposits to urban centers 
[Christoffersen]. Most serious of all, it appears that oper-
ations of RFMs in most countries are resulting in inefficient 
allocation of resources, causing income and asset ownership 
concentration, allowing financial resources to flow out of low 
income areas and, in some cases, diverting resources out of agri-
culture [Araujo and Meyer, Adams and Tommy, Vogel, 1977, Onado and 
Porteri]. 
Over the past few years an increasing number of observers 
have criticized RFM performance [Von Pischke, 1979, Lipton, 
Gonzalez-Vega, 1977]. They argue that too little attention 
has been given to the economic and policy environment that 
influences RFM performance, and they also challenge the vali-
dity of many assumptions on which RFM projects are built. 
In addition, they attack policies commonly used to influence 
the behavior of lenders, borrowers, and financial markets as 
a whole. Ubiquitous low interest rate policies have taken 
the brunt of these attacks [Shaw]. 
Out of these criticisms, new suggestions have emerged 
on changes needed in RFM projects so that publically-stated 
goals and the performance of RFMs can be more closely syn-
chronized. Despite increasing consensus, there have been 
very few changes in rural financial market projects to date. 
We speculate in the last section of this paper on why these 
changes are so slow in coming. 
New Views on Rural Financial 
Market Projects 
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A key element in the new views on RFMs is the identifi-
cation of the expected real rate of interest as a major de-
terminant of borrower, saver and lender behavior [Gonzalez-
Vega, 1976, Vogel, 1979]. Real rates are also thought to 
influence strongly the overall performance of financial 
markets. Proponents of the new views argue that low real 
rates of interest seriously disrupt the supply side of the 
financial system. Because interest rates on savings deposits 
are low, savers minimize the amount of financial savings they 
hold [Adams, 1978]. This forces formal lenders to rely on 
external funds to finance loans. Poor people in rural areas 
are especially disadvantaged by these low interest rates on 
savings. In large part the rich evade interest rate restric-
tions on savings accounts by lending through informal finan-
cial markets or by buying non-financial assets. The poor, 
however, find it difficult to assemble sufficient funds to 
acquire many asset forms: e.g. large animals, land, gold, 
buildings, time certificates of deposit. They are thus forced 
to hold surpluses in cash, crop inventories or small animals, 
or to consume what might otherwise be saved. Furthermore, 
because the funds lent in these programs are not locally 
mobilized, borrowers feel little obligation to repay funds 
that are provided by national or foreign governments [Matienzo, 
Central Bank of Ceylon]. 
-9-
Because the risks and marginal costs of lending to agri-
culture in general, and to the rural poor in particular, are 
often higher than for loans to other parts of the economy, 
formal lenders tend to shy from lending in rural areas, even 
with government pressure to serve agriculture [Ahmed, Ladman 
and others]. Lenders have even less incentive to lend to ag-
riculture and the rural poor when regulations set interest 
rates lower on agricultural loans than can be charged on 
other loans [Blitz and Long]. The same microeconomic forces 
cause formal lenders to shorten the loan term structure and 
shift their funds to a more concentrated and less risky port-
folio when expected rates of inflation increase [Adams and 
Nelson]. 
Governments have used a number of techniques and policies, 
up to and including the nationalization of banks, to force 
formal lenders to ignore their own profit and loss considera-
tions, and serve some social objective or target group not 
reached through market criteria [Desai, Shetty, Agrawal]. 
Generally, the results of these efforts have been disappoint-
ing [Vogel and Gonzalez-Vega]. It is virtually impossible 
for a government to monitor and enforce loan rationing poli-
cies when hundreds of thousands of formal loans are made in 
widely disbursed areas of the country. The essential proper-
ties of financial instruments are their fungibility, their 
divisibility, and their substitutability [Von Pischke and 
Adams]. Lenders, for example, may meet the letter of the 
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law by simply reclassifying loans to meet quota requirements. 
The lender may also shift small borrowers who are funded with 
the lender's own resources onto lines of credit provided by 
the government or by an aid agency. The lender may then 
lend its own released funds for non-priority, yet profitable, 
loans. This may result in little or no additional lending 
to the priority group or activity specified by the lender. 
The same problems of fungibility occur among borrowers. 
Negative real rates of interest also distort loan demand. 
If expected interest rates are negative, the borrower may 
realize an income transfer by taking a loan, investing the 
money in an asset that increases in value at the same pace 
as inflation and later liquidating the asset to repay the 
loan. With negative real rates of interest some loan demand 
may be for acquiring this income transfer rather than for 
making productive use of loans [Boulding and Wilson]. These 
income transfers can be very sizable when real rates of inter-
est are highly negative and sizable formal agricultural credit 
programs are involved, as in Brazil, for example, where yearly 
income transfers of 3-4 billion dollars U.S. may be involved 
[Sayad, 1979]. The excess loan demand stemming from the nega-
tive interest rates may also cause the lender to create a 
number of administrative hurdles that raise the loan trans-
action costs for potential borrowers who are not profitable 
clients. In this way the lender effectively discourages loan 
demand from some potential borrowers without violating policy 
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directives. In the end, lenders exclude small borrowers and 
concentrate their "rationed" loans on large borrowers who 
have excellent collateral. 
The new views also include more positive attitudes 
about informal financial markets [Barton, Begashaw, 1978, 
Harriss, Bouman, Igben, Levi]. Informal lenders are thought 
to provide valuable services, and impose lower costs on most 
borrowers than had been generally thought. The opportunity 
costs of money lent in the informal market by merchants or 
farmers is usually ignored by those who criticize informal 
lenders' charges on loans. Singh, for example, found the 
opportunity costs of money informally lent by some Indian 
farmers amounted, on an annual basis, to 77 percent of the 
value of the money lent. These opportunity costs made up 
over half of the interest charges. Harriss's recent work 
among merchants in Southern India, who also extend informal 
loans, showed their opportunity costs of lending, instead of 
using the funds to internally expand their buying and selling 
operations, amounted to as much as 63 percent of the value of the 
loans extended. In addition, Nehman showed that for the rural 
poor, informal loans may be no more costly than formal loans when 
total loan transaction costs for the new and small borrower are 
carefully calculated. In some cases, at least, the informal lender 
is also able to provide more flexible and more desirable financial 
services than do formal lenders. The fact that borrowers often 
choose to repay informal loans before they repay formal loans sup-
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ports this conclusion. 
The new views also suggest that the rural poor may have 
much larger savings capacities than heretofore recognized, 
when they are given adequate opportunities and incentives to 
save [Wai, 1972b, Von Pischke, 1978]. Only a few studies 
have been done on voluntary rural savings capacities, and 
some of these have used survey data that may have included 
under-reported income information [Bhalla, Williamson]. Only 
a handful of studies have used farm record-keeping data or 
time series survey data that may have given accurate estimates 
of rural household consumption, savings and income activities. 
Studies on time series Farm Household Economy Surveys in 
Japan, for example, showed average propensities to save that 
grew from .10 in 1950 to .22 in 1973 [Mizogushi]. Marginal 
propensities to save were significantly higher. Studies 
using time series data from Farm Record-Keeping families in 
Taiwan showed even higher average and marginal propensities 
to save over the period 1960 to 1974 [Ong Adams and Singh]. 
Similar studies on time series data from Farm Household 
Economic Surveys in Korea showed average propensities to save 
that ranged from .15 in 1962 to .33 in 1974 [Hyun Adams and 
Hushak, Ro, Ahn Adams and Ro]. Marginal propensities to save 
were, again, substantially higher. Less comprehensive studies 
in Kenya, Mexico, Malaysia, the Sudan, the Punjab of India 
and Zambia also uncovered substantial voluntary savings capa-
cities [Adams, Reynolds and Corredor, Singh and others]. 
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Several studies of cooperatives and farmers' associations 
in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan showed that mobilization of vol-
untary financial savings deposits in these institutions played 
a major role in their economic strength [Lee Kim and Adams, 
Kato, Tuan]. Borrowers are more likely to repay loans if a 
substantial part of the money lent is mobilized via savings 
deposits in the local area. 
The new consensus also holds that borrowers' loan trans-
action costs are more important in determining loan demand 
among small and new borrowers than are interest rates. In 
contrast, large and experienced borrowers may be very sensi-
tive to changes in interest rates because interest payments 
make up a large part of their total borrowing costs and their 
less obvious loan transaction costs are negligible. In a 
Bangladesh study, Shahjahan found that interest payments made 
up only 17 percent of the total borrowers' transaction costs 
for those farmers with small loans from the Agricultural 
Development Bank. At the same time, large borrowers from 
the same bank incurred interest payments that made up 57 per-
cent of their total borrowing costs. All borrowers from the bank 
paid the same rate of interest on their loans, seven percent. 
Ahmed's work in the Sudan supports these results. 
The new views also posit that overall savings behavior 
in rural areas is quite sensitive to changes in real rates 
of interest paid on deposits. The preliminary results from 
a pilot savings mobilization project in Peru, that involves 
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substantial increases in the interest rates paid on deposits, 
strongly suggests that people in rural areas will substan-
tially increase their savings deposits if given security, 
liquidity and high returns. Earlier rural savings performance 
in Taiwan, Japan and Korea reinforce this conclusion. 
The new views go on to argue that interest rates and 
loan supervision have a weak effect on decisions to adopt 
new technology or make on-farm investments. Loan supervision 
is often ineffective because the supervisor knows little 
about the practical problems of farming, has little incentive 
to provide useful technical assistance, or has few if any 
profitable new production techniques to extend to the borrow-
ing farmer [Begashaw, 1980, Adams Pena and Giles]. Interest 
payments are only one of several factors that influence loan 
use decisions. While everyone wants to pay the lowest inter-
est rate possible, borrowers may be even more interested in 
the non-interest borrowing transaction costs, the timeliness 
of the loan disbursement, the flexibility of loan repayment 
procedures, and the availability of additional loans from 
the lender [Barry and Baker]. Many advocates of low interest 
rates ignore the importance of other borrower loan transaction 
costs in the borrowing decision, especially for small farmers. 
For example, if interest payments only make up 25 percent of 
total borrowing cost, a doubling of interest rates will only 
increase borrowing costs by one-quarter. It might be argued 
that if formal lenders were allowed to charge higher rates on 
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agricultural loans that they would eliminate a number of the 
loan application hurdles and collateral requirements that 
currently make up a large part of borrowers' loan transaction 
costs. Higher interest rates may result in lower borrowing 
costs for some borrowers and tilt the system towards a more 
equitable inclusion of heretofore excluded smaller farmers. 
Low interest rate advocates also ignore that interest 
payments especially among small and medium sized borrowers, 
often make up a very small part of total operating expenses. 
In 1970, small farmers in Taiwan and Korea, for example, spent 
on the average only two percent and one percent, respectively, 
of their total farm and household cash expenditures on inter-
est payments. Among only the borrowing households the per-
centages were less than four percent in both countries. In 
most cases, product or input prices are much stronger incen-
tives to adopt new technology than are interest rates. 
Furthermore, these prices have a much wider impact among the 
farming population than do credit programs. 
Interest rates do, however, have a very strong influence 
on lenders' behavior (formal lenders as well as formal savers). 
Under normal conditions receipts from interest payments make 
up a very large part of a formal agricultural lender's total 
revenues. Major increases or decreases in interest rates 
applied on farmer loans, therefore, have dramatic impacts on 
the marginal as well as total revenues and thus surpluses or 
deficits of the lender. Even in nationalized banking systems 
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these lender revenues and surpluses or deficits largely deter-
mine the overall vitality of RFMs and their ability and will-
ingness to perform financial intermediation in a socially de-
sirable manner [Von Pischke, 1979]. With long periods of 
negative real rates of interest, lenders are forced to rely 
on permanent subsidies to cover their operating expenses, 
to cut back on their scale of operations, or allow the quality 
and quantity of their financial services to deteriorate 
[Adams and Pablo]. 
Critics have also questioned attempts to include loans 
as part of a package of inputs. They argue that packaging 
loans and use of other similar non-market rationing devices 
diminishes the most attractive and useful property of finance, 
fungibility. It is the fungibility of money that allows it 
to be converted into any good or service available in the 
market [Von Pi~chke and Adams]. Many planners try to destroy 
this essential property of finance by allocating loans in 
fixed quotas, making loans in kind, or trying to specify the 
ultimate use of the loan. This planning-approach to the al-
location of loans assumes that a borrower knows not what is 
best for him or her, that loans can be allocated like physical 
inputs, and that the planner in the capital city can effec-
tively make efficiency and equity decisions for thousands of 
heterogeneous borrowers. Pushed to its extreme, the planning 
approach to loan allocation would result in a return to a barter 
economy. Fortunately, the ability of planners to diminish fungibi-
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lity is extremely limited; secondary markets for goods lent in kind 
quickly spring up (borrowers receiving the rationed input will sell 
it to others who need it more), and borrowers can substitute 
borrowed liquidity for their own liquidity when planners' priori-
ties do not match those of the borrower. The widespread non-market 
rationing devices used for agricultural loans in many low-income 
countries are mostly a mirage and have very little impact on the 
allocation of real resources [Vogel and Larson]. Their main effect 
is to increase the total costs to society of financial inter-
mediation and also to undermine the viability of lenders. 
Some observers are also questioning the way traditional 
credit projects are evaluated. They argue that too much em-
phasis and time has been spent on trying to measure the impact 
of loans at the farm level [David and Meyer]. Because loans 
readily mix with other liquid assets, it is costly to accur-
ately measure the impact of the additional liquidity provided 
by a loan to farm-households [Barry Hopkin and Baker]. It is 
very difficult to attribute changes in household expenditures 
or investments to a specific loan, and to isolate how many 
of these activities would have occurred without this loan. 
Because the farm-household impacts of loans are so difficult 
to measure, the new views hold that the performance and vitality 
of the lender and of overall RFMs may be the most useful 
measures of the success or failure of a credit project. 
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Key Elements in a New RFM Strategy 
The new views on RFM projects challenge many of the as-
sumptions and policies that have been vital parts of LIC agri-
cultural credit projects in the past. They also stress that 
the results from these projects are not consistent with effi-
ciency or equity goals. While the specific suggestions for 
improving the results of RFM projects must be time and place 
specific, a few general suggestions do emerge out of these 
views. 
One of the most prominent suggestions is that more flex-
ible interest rates could be a key factor in improving the 
results from most RFM projects [Gonzalez-Vega, 1977, Vogel, 
1977, D. Adams]. Nominal rates of interest must be flexible so 
that they go up and down with inflation. Interest rate poli-
cies on both credit and deposits should be aimed at maintain-
ing relatively stable and positive real rates of interest. 
Lenders (banks and individual savers) must expect to receive 
positive real returns most of the time from their financial 
transactions if RFMs are to function equitably and efficiently. 
With more attractive incentives for savers RFMs could 
mount major saving mobilization schemes in rural areas [Mauri]. 
The previously mentioned pilot savings mobilization project 
in Peru, and another pilot project in Bangladesh that is ex-
perimenting with more flexible and higher interest rates on 
both loans and deposits in rural areas should provide insights 
on how to proceed with larger schemes [G. Adams]. As sug-
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gested earlier, changing the image of who owns the money lent 
will improve loan repayment. If formal lenders depended less 
on central banks, foreign aid and government budgets for 
funds, they would experience less political interference 
[Ladman and Tinnermeier]. If lenders, such as cooperatives, 
were able to provide attractive savings deposit facilities 
to their members, it would give more cooperative members 
strong reasons for being active members [Robert, Youngjohns, 
Illy]. In early stages of development, savings mobilization 
should receive top priority in RFM activities, and loans 
should receive secondary attention. 
In most cases it also appears that the building of new 
specialized credit institutions to service fragmented finan-
cial needs in rural areas should receive less attention. 
These institutions usually rely on government subsidies or 
foreign aid for funds to make up their loan portfolio and 
to cover operating expenses. The funding source often loses 
interest in underwriting the costs of the agency after a 
time and ·reduces funding. Because the agency does not typi-
cally accept deposits it becomes heavily dependent on the 
government for continued funding, and political interventions 
into the operations of the agency become common. Furthermore, 
the agency is often asked to lend to a relatively narrow tar-
get group: e.g. livestock farmers, long-term investments, 
small farmers. This loan specialization does not allow the 
agency to diversify its lending risks nor to service non-farm rural 
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enterprises [Von Pischke, 1979, Meyer]. Instead of continuing to 
emphasize the creation of new lenders, more attention should be 
directed to diagnosing why existing financial institutions are not 
providing the types and amounts of services desired. Policy 
changes should be aimed at providing more incentives to existing 
lenders to expand their services in the desired directLons. 
Governments and aid agencies must also use care when 
they introduce additional loanable funds into RFMs via spe-
cial rediscount facilities in central banks. For example, 
why should banks in the Dominican Republic or the Philippines 
open new savings deposit facilities in their branches and pay 
6 to 8 percent on these deposits, when they can get redis-
count money from the central bank at lower rates! 
Finally, RFM projects would be improved if designers 
and policymakers stopped viewing loans as inputs similar to 
fertilizer, labor, seeds, or breeding stock. Rather, loans 
must be viewed for what they are, claims on resources that 
allow the borrower command over additional goods and services 
that may or may not be used for the purposes stated in the 
loan application. Instead of trying to ration this command 
over resources in predetermined lumps to thousands of borrowers, 
policymakers should provide proper incentives for lenders-
mobilizers to perform in more socially desirable ways. Stress 
should be placed on improving the process of financial inter-
mediation and reducing the costs of this process for society. 
The focus should be on inducing RFMs as a whole to service 
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better the credit and deposit needs of a much broader clien-
tele in rural areas. Along with this, RFMs should also be 
given strong inducements to adopt innovations that reduce 
the total costs of financial intermediation. RFMs cannot be 
used to transfer cheap credit to thousands or millions of 
small, previously unserviced farmers. If governments attempt 
to push this strategy, the cheap credit will mostly end up in 
the hands of the wealthy [Sayad, 1977]. Other methods must 
be used to help more directly the rural poor. 
Why so Little Change in RFM 
Projects and Policies? 
There are at least four major explanations for why so 
little change has occurred in agricultural credit projects 
the past several decades, even though a number of people are 
heavily criticizing the results of traditional projects. The 
first reason might be that the new views are incorrect or 
that they are based on faulty research or on research done 
on cases or areas that make generalization inappropriate. 
It seems to us that, while additional research would be use~ 
ful, enough information is at hand and enough knowledgeable 
people agree on the results of this research so that some 
experimentation with new policies along the lines presented 
above are warranted. At the very least, advocates of tradi-
tional agricultural credit projects and policies should be 
required to offer more than received wisdom, horror stories, 
and seat-of-the-pants empiricism to justify their positions. 
-22-
A second reason for so little change might be that it 
takes a good deal of time for policymakers to understand, 
accept, and adopt the ideas included in these new views. 
Many of these views challenge dogma about RFMs that have deep 
historical roots whose "truth" has been reinforced in the 
minds of policymakers by endless repetition, numerous tales 
of horror, and religious teachings. Old ideas die very hard! 
It took Christian societies many centuries to view usury and 
lending with some logic rather than all passion [Nelson]. 
Intermediaries, especially lenders, have been viewed with 
suspicion in almost all societies. Is that because they are 
often "outsiders" or "foreigners": e.g. Jews in Europe, 
Chinese in Southeast Asia, people from the Middle East in 
Latin America? [Riggs] These intermediaries are often targets 
of criticism stemming from any unexplained economic discomfort 
experienced by producers and/or consumers. Because most 
countries are rapidly moving away from subsistence and barter 
activities into highly monitized economies, we feel policy-
makers do not have the luxury of waiting several centuries 
to understand the importance of finance in development. 
A third explanation might be that policymakers understand 
that RFM projects are not working well and that elimination of 
some RFM distortions might improve resource allocation and 
help meet equity goals. The reasons these policy changes are 
not made are that distortions in RFMs are often justified as 
offsets to other distortions in the economic system that 
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penalize agriculture [Vogel, 1979]. These other distortions 
may be overvalued exchange rates, price controls on food, 
import regulations, taxing policies, or sectoral investment 
strategies favoring industry. The distortions in RFMs are 
second best measures aimed at partially offsetting these 
other distortions. To the extent that circumstances contin-
ually force the adoption of broader macroeconomic policies 
that penalize agriculture, policymakers may feel compelled 
to resort to concessionary priced credit programs to help 
the sector adapt satisfactorily to these other penalizing 
measures [Bourne and Graham, 1980b]. Some argue that it 
would be impossible to substitute appropriate policy adjust-
ment to make RFMs perform more satisfactorily unless these 
other distortions are also removed. Thus, the prospects for 
effective reform of RFM policies becomes inextricably linked 
to the difficult tasks of reforming the entire structure of 
the economy. 
We agree that adjustments in financial market policies, 
accompanied by reforms in other economic policies, as done 
in South Korea in the mid-1960s, is the best way to improve 
the performance of RFMs [Brown, Cole and Lyman]. We feel, 
however, that reforms in RFM policies alone, can result in 
important gains in resource allocation efficiency and more 
equitable allocation of income. The complex and often confus-
ing second-best arguments used to justify distortions in fi-
nancial markets make it difficult for many to understand the 
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vital issues involved. The tax-subsidy framework often used 
to justify concessionary priced agricultural loans to offset 
other adverse policies in agriculture breaks down for at 
least three reasons: this policy concentrates income, it 
does not result in more efficient resource allocation, and 
it discourages savings. 
Proponents of this line of argument ignore that low in-
terest rates strongly affect lender behavior, and adminis-
trative fiats are largely ineffective in reversing this be-
havior. With low interest rates the lender often has excess 
demand for the "sweet money." The lender reacts by transfer-
ring part of the loan transaction costs to the borrower, lends 
to those who present very little default risk, requires sub-
stantial collateral, tries to increase the average size of 
loans made, and excludes new borrowers. The net result is 
that lenders concentrate cheap loans in the hands of relatively 
wealthy and experienced borrowers [Vogel, 1977]. Because the 
subsidy involved in cheap credit is proportional to the amount 
of money borrowed, the subsidy also ends up being very con-
centrated [Gonzalez-Vega, 1977]. The microeconomic interest 
of the lender typically swamp the effects of policy directives 
from the capital city aimed at forcing less concentration of 
loans. It is impossible for policymakers to police adminis-
trative fiats in RFMs because of the large number of lenders 
and borrowers that are usually involved. 
It should also be clear that, because of fungibility, 
-25-
cheap credit will not help to offset inefficiencies in re-
source use caused by policies adverse to agriculture. If 
cheap credit is to off-set inefficiencies, the cheap credit 
must result in additional use of inputs in the production 
process that is discouraged by the price distortion due to 
adverse policy. Because loans are claims on real resources 
and provide additional liquidity, the borrower can choose to 
use this additional liquidity in any economic activity avail-
able in the market. If the price of product X is artificially 
low, why should the borrower choose to buy more inputs to pro-
duce more X just because the costs of the additional liquidity 
provided by a loan is kept low through concessionary interest 
rates? Economic theory and common sense lead one to expect that 
the borrower will use the additional liquidity to buy that good 
or service providing the highest marginal return or utility. 
The essential property of finance, fungibility, largely dis-
solves the ability of policymakers to offset inefficiencies 
in resource allocation in agriculture caused by one policy, 
with cheap credit. 
In our opinion the strongest case against the second best 
argument can be made on what low interest rates on loans, and 
thus on deposits, do to savers and the overall vitality of 
rural financial markets. Low interest rates on financial 
savings seriously weaken the incentive that many people in the 
society have to postpone consumption. These potential savers 
are the invisible victims of cheap credit [Kane, 1970]. 
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Low interest rates force many people in the society to use 
their "surpluses" in economic activities that have low mar-
ginal returns. The cheap loans also cause the rich to colon-
ize most formal agricultural credit programs, and the low 
rates of interest paid on savings reinforce the exclusion of 
the poor from participating in formal financial intermediation 
[Blair]. Economies of scale and widespread popular support 
for formal financial market activities are impossible to 
realize under these conditions. 
A final reason for the lack of change in RFM policies 
may be due to the fact that the political system finds that 
the current performance of RFMs is satisfactory [Ladman and 
Tinnermeier]. That is, political forces in the country may 
be more than satisfied with the results of distortions intro-
duced by negative real rates of interest in RFMs because they 
result in the allocation of political patronage in the form 
of applied income transfers to those influential people in 
the economy who end up receiving most of the cheap credit 
[Robert]. Distortions in interest rates as well as other 
price distortions, caused by fixed exchange rates, import 
and export regulations and licenses allow the political sys-
tem to allocate "administrative profits." If interest rates 
were raised to equilibrium levels, the political system 
would have no cheap credit to grant to those favored patrons 
and strong supporters of the political system. 
One might ask why individuals in society who are disad-
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vantaged by low interest rate policies do not organize to 
press for more appropriate policies. An explanation for 
this is that large numbers of widely disbursed individuals 
(i.e. landless workers and small to medium-sized farmers) 
are disadvantaged by current interest rate policies. They 
are largely excluded from access to formal credit because of 
the credit rationing process practiced by formal lenders. 
Others are paid low returns on their small savings or decide 
not to save at all in financial form because of the low re-
turns. When a large number of people are only hurt a small 
amount by a policy, it is difficult to mobilize these indi-
viduals for political action. The opposite is true for those 
who benefit from low interest rate policies. Many who receive 
these benefits are powerful individuals. Any policy change that 
reduces the benefits they receive through cheap credit draws imme-
diate and strong reactions. This may be one of the reasons why a 
number of powerful economic interests are so tolerant of inflation. 
Inflation along with low and inflexible interest rate policies 
allow those with access to concessionary priced loans to receive 
large income transfers because of the negative real rates of 
interest. Inflation also allows the political system to mask the 
magnitudes and directions of the political patronage transferred 
through the financial system. In most cases it is not a conspiracy 
among a few individuals that results in fixed nominal interest 
rates, inflation pressures, and negative real rates of interest 
rates. Rather, it is a convergence of interests that result in the 
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popularity of negative real rates of interest once they have become 
established through rising rates of inflation [Lipton]. 
The new consensus attacks traditional RFM projects, 
and suggests ways these projects can be reformulated so that 
efficiency, equity and capital formation goals can be realized. 
These views call for a major overhaul in how RFMs are used 
in development. Despite these strong criticisms, advocates 
of the new views have said very little about the nuts and 
bolts of translating this consensus into new policies and 
projects. The substantial number of articles, papers, books, 
conferences and workshops that have pushed these new views 
have not been sufficient to convince policymakers to abandon 
traditional RFM projects. A very small amount of experimen-
tation along the lines of the new consensus is taking place, 
but it is surprising that more experimentation is not carried 
out since some of the new views can be tested in small pilot 
projects that have very small start-up and close-down costs. 
Do external aid agencies fail to push these types of experi-
ments because they lead to self-help activities rather than 
large loans or grants typically involved in traditional 
credit projects? 
We do not have a crystal ball that allows us to forecast 
the things that must be done to get policy changes made that 
are necessary to improve the performance of RFMs in LICs. 
Some further testing of these new views is probably needed 
to further verify the policy changes suggested. It is also 
• 
• 
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likely that more communication among researchers who are ar-
guing for the new views and policymakers is needed to clarify 
the complicated and confusing issues involved. Researchers 
also need to do a more careful job of documenting the results 
of current projects and RFM policies, and clarifying the ex-
tent to which RFM distortions are or are not efficient, 
second-best adjustments to offset other economic distortions. 
Researchers may also be able to help identify changes in 
policies outside RFMs that may compensate groups who lose 
benefits because of financial market reforms. However, this 
approach will only be possible in those cases where the implied 
subsidies flowing through financial markets are relatively 
small, real rates of interest are not highly concessionary 
or the total amount of formal agricultural credit is not large. 
In those cases where real rates of interest are highly 
negative, large amounts of money are lent through RFMs and/or 
loan repayment performance is very poor, it will be very dif-
ficult to devise ways to "buy-off" through compensating pol-
icies those groups that are currently receiving major income 
transfers through RFMs. If a group has the power to maintain 
interest rate policies that result in large income transfers 
to them or repel loan repayment pressures, they likely al-
ready have the political clout to manipulate other policies 
such as product prices, public investments, and new tech-
nology development to their advantage. 
• 
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Conclusions 
In concluding this review it is useful to recognize two 
broader problems generated by cheap agricultural credit. First, in 
those countries where the viability of lending institutions may be 
of secondary importance because they explicitly engage in deficit 
financing of these programs, extensive subsidized financing of 
agricultural credit programs can generate significant inflationary 
pressures. Recent work by the World Bank staff has highlighted the 
important role that the large volume of rural credit has played in 
adding to the money supply of Brazil in the mid to late 1970's and 
contributing substantially to inflationary pressures. 
Second, the degree and magnitude of credit subsidization 
in most countries has taken its toll on the amount of resourses 
available for other vital programs in such areas as agricultural 
research, basic infrastructure to lower the costs and risks of 
marketing and improved educational services for the rural 
population, among others. Unfortunately it is precisely in these 
areas that major efforts must be undertaken to improve the economic 
rate of return of farming. It is only when these bottlenecks are 
reduced that credit can really make a difference and in doing so 
can be priced realistically. Conversely, if these other problem 
areas are not properly dealt with credit (subsidized or not) will 
not make any difference. Credit by itself cannot raise the rate of 
return to farm investments. 
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Twenty years ago development experts began to realize 
that rural people in low income countries were able to count, 
even though many were not able to read. Schultz, Hopper and 
others did a valuable service by educating the development 
profession on the rationality of farmers in LICs. Currently, 
almost all knowledgeable persons working on development respect 
the ability of farmers in LICs to efficiently allocate their 
resources and respond to product prices, input prices, and 
new technology, with all its related risks, in rational ways. 
It is past time that the development profession recognized 
that these same individuals make similar rational decisions 
when they participate in financial markets. Current low in-
terest rate policies are making it virtually impossible to 
induce formal lenders to provide needed loan and deposit ser-
vices to the rural poor. We feel that financial systems will 
not produce the types of services needed to satisfy generally 
accepted development goals unless more enlightened policies 
along the lines suggested by the new views are adopted. 
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Footnotes 
* In this article we present a state-of-the-arts on analysis of 
rural financial markets in low income countries. We feel such 
a review is necessary because of the large amount of new work 
that has been done on this topic, and because the results of 
some of these recent analyses differ sharply from traditional 
views widely held on agricultural credit. Because of space 
limitations, we present only very brief textual summaries of 
empirical evidence to support our conclusions. We do, 
however, provide extensive citations that allow the reader 
access to literature we feel supports our assertions and 
conclusions. Our colleagues at Ohio State contributed a 
number of the ideas summarized here. Also, the Office of 
Rural Development and Development Administration Agency for 
International Development provided support for the preparation 
of this article. 
1/ Readers wanting more background on these ignored issues might 
look at [Gurley and Shaw, 1960, Gurley and Shaw, 1967, 
Shaw, 1973, and McKinnon, 1973]. 
2/ Those looking for details on agricultural credit projects 
might review [The Agency for International Development, 1973, 
Donald, and The World Bank, 1975]. 
31 For a statement of these assumptions in the 1950s, see 
[Technical Cooperation Administration, and Belshaw]. 
4/ 
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The real rate of interest is defined as 
l+i 
l+p 
- 1, 
where i is the nominal rate of interest, and p is some 
annual change in prices. 
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